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Clinic of the Clinamen: 
The Materiality of the Symptom
My clinical work with analysands who have changed sex has allowed me to 
understand that they had a very peculiar relation to their bodies. Everything 
took place as if the imaginary of their bodies had disappeared, like an open en-
velope letting go of its contents. While it is obvious that the Real of the body is 
the stuff of concrete physical matter, the materiality of the body is another mat-
ter altogether. When someone changes sex, such transformation implies that 
the materiality of the body, which one may believe could have been defined by 
organs that are more or less visible, is a materality not given but constructed. 
Anatomy, with its chromosomes, gametes, and genitalia, becomes then part 
of a mythical real that acquires signification only on a second stage, when the 
values of the sex assigned at birth are structured and a sexual positioning is 
assumed. For psychoanalysis, sexual difference is neither sex nor gender. Sex 
needs to be symbolized. Gender needs to be embodied. To have a sexual body 
means reaching what we may call a second materiality. The materiality that is 
required to accomplish this is that of the letter. The letter gives a consistency 
to the knot that holds together the body on the three structural registers and 
allows for a new distribution of jouissance.
My thoughts are based on my clinical work as well as on my reading of some 
memoirs written by people who have changed sex, both perspectives made me 
conclude that for the body “to hold,” a second materialization needs to take 
place; this is accomplished by way of torsions knotted by writing. Lucretius’ 
notion of the “clinamen” will allow me to explore trauma in a new light. I’ll give 
two clinical cases that illustrate the evolution of the symptom from a metaphor 
to an “effect of the Symbolic in the Real”. One case is an artist who finds a way 
of enjoying her unconscious, which brings a solution to her gender trouble; the 
other case is a transsexual man who uses scientific writing as a way of holding 
his body together and with it, of building a sexual identity. These cases point to 
the new materiality of the symptom.
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My general thesis is that Lacan moves from a theory of the signifier, that is to 
say, from language in the form it is accessible to psychonalysis which is the 
theory condensed in the formula “The unconscious is structured like a lan-
guage” towards a theory of the symptom as it is developed under the frame of 
the dialectic materialism. This is why Lacan proposed that Marx and not Freud 
introduced the notion of symptom1. Such notion of the symptom implies that 
the symptom is found in the real and not in the symbolic. Or, more precisely, 
the symptom that we identify is what is produced in the field of the Real. If the 
Real manifests itself in analysis and not only in analysis, if the notion of the 
symptom was introduced, well before Freud by Marx, so as to make it the sign of 
something which is what is not working out in the Real, if in other words, we are 
capable of operating on the symptom, it is in as far as the symptom is the effect 
of the Symbolic in the Real.2 
There will be, however, a third moment around 1976, when Lacan revisits in-
sights dating from the 1950s on the subjet of the ego (“moi”) and the symptom; 
they show that the knot of the symptom stems from a particular rewriting of the 
subject, which introduces a torsion of the Real. 
One can clearly observe a first period in a well-known passage of seminar XI 
devoted to the couple tuché and automaton. It is enough to read closely page 63 
of the seminar to become aware of how the relation to the real is ruled over by 
tuché, defined at the beginning of the chapter on tuché and automaton as “the 
encounter with the real”3. We also perceive that it is an accident that determines 
this relation: “If the development is entirely animated by accident, by the ob-
stacle of the tuché, it is in so far as the tuché brings us back to the the same at 
which pre-Socratic philosophy sought to motivate the world itself. It required 
a clinamen, an inclination, at some point.”4 The dicussion that follows is com-
plex: it revisits the concept of negation in Democritus, for whom physics are 
founded on the notion of nothing (“nothing is more real than nothing” was one 
1 Jacques Lacan, “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan : R.S.I.”, in Ornicar ?, 2, p. 96; 10 Decem-
ber 1974.
2 Ibid. 
3 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book 11, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: Norton, 1981, p. 53.
4 Ibid., p. 63.
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of his favorite maxims.) A certain concept of negativity was introduced into the 
heart of the Greek cosmos by Democritus who, moreover, held that thought and 
soul were material. Lucretius in his De rerum natura5 gives very clear and com-
pelling original atomist theory which explains how the properties of materials 
like water, air, metal, or even plants and animals are recreated—the indivisible 
properties not easily visible to human senses is contained in “atoms”. These 
“atoms” are nearer to our modern concept of “molecule” than to the atoms of 
modern science. Lucretius arguments that the void, a lot of open space between 
“atoms” is absolutely necessary to explain how gasses and fluids can change 
shape, flow, while metals can be molded, without changing the basic material 
properties. Michel Serres insists on the drift in the movement through the void 
as shown in his illuminating reading of Lucrecius.6 It the clinamen, that is, the 
atomic deviation or “swerve,” that functioned as the key: “deviation is the birth 
of everything”. If we take Serres’s terminology and compare it with Lacan’s, we 
see obvious parallels. 
Lacan had insisted on the “nothing” put forward by Democritus in Seminar XI. 
Lacan uses the Lucretian clinamen to think the logic of trauma. If we agree to 
take the deviation that upsets a preceding equilibrium as tuche or an effect of 
the clinamen, this conception will introduce turbulence into an unconscious 
“structured like a language”. By introducing chance, turbulence makes the 
unconscious a less closed system. Another point of analogy is that atoms, as 
Serres explains, are letters, which combined into sentences, can be joined to 
form volumes. If we can speak at all, it is because of this deviation. The clina-
men introduces a breakup of order, and is thus radically opposed to repetition. 
Michel Serres writes that “meaning is a bifurcation of univocity.” Turbulence 
disturbs repetition by troubling the flow of the identical, and pulls and pushes 
in the same way as the symptom does, an issue to which I will return. Psycho-
analytic work will use turbulence in a deliberate practice of equivocation and 
verbal punning so as to undo the set of fixed and univocal meanings initially 
presented by the analysand. This is why Lacan talks about the  “phaunétique” 
dimension of the letter in Joyce, between phoneme, phonetique and phaune: 
5 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. R.E. Latham, ed. John Godwin, London: 
Penguin, 2005.
6 Michel Serres, La Naissance de la physique dans le texte de Lucrèce. Fleuves et turbulences, 
Paris: Minuit, 1977.
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If I call up the mythical figure of the phaune, it is to move towards another 
mythical and impossible figure, that of the hermaphrodite that often is guiding 
transsexual fantasies.
But before moving ahead on this very issue and with the idea of understanding 
Lacan’s radical new concept of the symptom, I will sketch a rapid archeology of 
the notion of symptom in Lacan. In Seminar I from 1953–1954, Freud’s Papers 
on Technique, one reads “the ego is structured exactly like a symptom. At the 
heart of the subject, it is only a priveleged symptom, the human symptom par 
excellence, the mental illness of man”7. But Lacan very soon seems to abandon 
the idea of the ego as symptom or more interestingly the symptom as ego, some-
thing to which he will return in his seminar on Joyce more than twenty years 
later. In the next seminar of just one year later, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in 
the Technique of Psychoanalysis, one finds: 
Because the symptom is in itself, through and through, signification, that is to 
say, truth, truth taking shape. It is to be distinguished from the natural index 
in that it is already structured in terms of the signified and signifier, with all 
that entails, namely the play of signifiers. Even within the concrete given of the 
symptom, there is already a precipitation into signifying material. The symptom 
is the inverse side of a discourse.8 
One can hear here a preview of the 1969–1970 Seminar 17, L’envers or The Other 
Side of Psychoanalysis, with its four discourses, but I would insist here on the 
reference to signifiers as material or to the materiality of the signifier. I want 
to focus on these formulations because they take distance from those better 
known from 1956–57, in which the symptom is conceived of as a metaphor, 
therefore “The symptom is nothing but a metaphor”9 and of course in “The in-
stance of the letter in the unconscious:” in which the metaphor is defined as 
“one word for another”. Lacan explains that 
7 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 1: Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953–
1954, trans. John Forrester, New York: Norton, 1988, p. 16, 13 January 1954.
8 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 2: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the 
Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–1955, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988, p. 320; 29 June 1955.
9 Jacques Lacan, Le séminaire, livre IV, La relation d’objet, Paris: Seuil, 1994. 
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Metaphor’s two-stage mechanism is the very mechanism by which symptoms, 
in the analytic sense are determined. Between the enigmatic signifier of sexual 
trauma and the term it comes to replace in a current signifying chain, a spark 
flies that fixes in a symptom—a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken 
as a signifying element—the signification, that is inaccessible to the conscious 
subject, by which the symptom may dissolve.10 
The practice of the “variable-length psychoanalytic session,” Lacan’s contro-
versial technique of scansion, tries to introduce a cut into a cycle of repetition, 
interfering with the jouissance by introducing an inclination, a clinamen. Like 
a pun, the cut of the scansion reoganizes letters and sends the analysand to-
wards an enigma whose resolution is not found in historical reconstruction but 
in the invention of new signifiers. The idea is to cause an effect of nomination 
and not of symbolic or metaphoric substitution. This is a movement that, unlike 
that of a metaphor, is not reversible. It is not moving down the chain as in the 
false knot that one finds in the Olympic rings, but a true Borromean knot in 
which all three rings are so interdependent that if we cut one, the other three 
come loose. The issue here is not to replace one ring with another but to pull 
strings that will tighten a knot. Already in the session of December 19 1974, 
Lacan talks about the limits of the metaphor, and proposes putting aside mean-
ing. I read this as proposing that the resolution of the symptom is no longer a 
ciphering of a hidden meaning but rather the creation of something new ap-
pearing in the void. 
The big change in Lacan’s theorization of the symptom takes place in 1974, the 
year of seminar RSI. In fact just before launching of the seminar, on October 31 
1974, in the “Discours de Rome – La troisième” Lacan declares: “I call symptom 
what comes from the real”. This idea is further developed in the opening ses-
sion of RSI when Lacan comments on a strike: 
as analyst, I can only take the strike to be a symptom, in the sense that this year 
perhaps, I will manage to convince you of it, that the symptom, to refer to one of 
my three categories, belongs to the Real.11 
10 Jacques Lacan, “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious”, in Écrits, trans. Bruce 
Fink, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, p. 431.
11 “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan : R.S.I.”, 19 November 1974 (unpublished).
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…it is in the symptom that we identify what is produced in the field of the Real. If 
the Real manifests itself in analysis and not only in analysis, if the notion of the 
symptom was introduced, well before Freud by Marx, so as to make it the sign of 
something which is what is not working out in the Real, if in other words, we are 
capable of operating on the symptom, it is in as far as the symptom is the effect 
of the Symbolic in the Real.12 
To look for the origin of the notion of symptom, which is not at all to be looked 
for in Hippocrates, which is to be looked for in Marx, who was the first in the link 
that he made between capitalism, and what? The good old times, what people 
call them when they want, in short, to try to call them something else, feudal 
times. Read all the literature on this. Capitalism is considered as having cer-
tain effects, and why in effect would it not have some! These effects are on the 
whole beneficial, since it has the advantage of reducing to nothing the prole-
tarian man, thanks to which the proletarian man realises the essence of man, 
and by being stripped of everything is charged with being the Messiah of the 
future. Such is the way in which Marx analyses the notion of symptom. He gives 
of course crowds of other symptoms, but the relation of this with a faith in man 
is quite indisputable.13 
If we make of man, no longer anything whatsoever who conveys a future ideal, 
but if we determine him from the particularity, in every case, of his unconscious 
and the way in which he enjoys it, the symptom remains at the same place that 
Marx put it, but it takes on a different meaning. It is not a social symptom, it is a 
particular symptom. No doubt, these particular symptoms correspond to types, 
and the symptom of the obsessional is not the symptom of the hysteric.14  
Lacan’s 1974–1975 RSI seminar is a turning-point. In it, Lacan systematically in-
troduces the Borromean knot. This knot is made out of the intertwining of three 
rings, which correspond to the tripartite structure Lacan called the Real, the 
Imaginary, and the Symbolic orders. Although heterogeneous, these registers 
can intersect and hold together. Lacan chose the Borromean knot because if its 
main characteristic—the rings are so interdependent that if one ring is unknot-
12 “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan : R.S.I.” in Ornicar ?, 2, p. 96; 10 December 1974.
13 “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan : R.S.I.” in  Ornicar ?, 4, p. 106; 18 February 1975.
14 Ibid.
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ted, the other three come loose. The Borroeman knot ties up together the reg-
isters of the Symbolic, the Real, and the Imaginary whose interlocking circles 
sustain reality for the subject. This “Borromeization” of the unconscious has 
direct consequences on the clinic and leads to a new definition of the symptom. 
Lacan breaks away from the medical model and brings the symptom closer to a 
mathematical function. 
By the time of RSI, Lacan was working in mathematical topology and knot the-
ory, borrowing a syntax and vocabulary in an effort to offer a formalization 
of what he observed in the analytic experience. This shift from linguistics to 
topology carries along major clinical consequences. In the same manner that 
Marx became aware that ancient materialism implied an effect of structure (if 
we cannot see atoms, we can think of their movement as turbulence; atoms fall 
following a slope, this is the principle of the clinamen, a deviation that operates 
in a void that by definition cannot be perceived), Lacan complicates the notion 
of matter and of materialism when he makes of jouissance his only ontology. 
This will be my focus here. 
By the mid 1970s, Lacan no longer thought of the symptom as something to 
decode, a carrier of a repressed message (a signifier) that can be deciphered 
by reference to the unconscious “structured like a language,” but as the trace 
of the unique way someone can come to be and enjoy one’s unconscious. The 
symptom (which in 1976 will be renamed sinthome) is now considered an inven-
tion that allows someone to live by providing the essential organization of jou-
issance. “The symptom cannot be defined otherwise than by the way in which 
each one enjoys the unconscious.” At this point in Lacan’s elaboration, the aim 
of the cure is no longer to get rid of symptoms but to identify with one’s unique 
sinthome in order to enjoy it. Identification with the symptom occurs when one 
identifies with the particular form of their enjoyment from which hangs what 
and who someone is. 
This rethinking of the symptom will have consequences concerning the end of 
analysis. The new symptom makes analysis terminable. If psychoanalysis helps 
“to provide for the analysand the meaning of their symptoms” (as Lacan wrote 
in the Introduction of the German edition of Écrits) is to not so much because the 
ultimate meaning of the symptom is finally deciphered, but because the analy-
sand is somehow freed from engaging in an interminable search for meaning. 
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This does not mean that there is no revelation of truth. Since the truth lies (la 
vérité ment), the analysand can escape the interminable search down the met-
onymic chain of meanings, which inevitably leads to frustration and traps the 
analysand in the belief of an irreductible “knowledge without subject”15.
As we know Lacan will complete his theoretical quarter turn when he gives a 
new clinical meaning to the notion of symptom by rewriting it as sinthome in 
1975–1976—this is Joyce’s sinthome. But this new contribution does not appear 
out of the blue since as he noted in 1975 “The sinthome is a way of writing what 
before was the symptom”.16 The symptom is what holds together the Real, the 
Symbolic, and the Imaginary.17 Lacan places the symptom exactly at the place 
where the knot fails, where there is a “lapsus” in the knot18. The symptom is 
clearly located in the Real and it is knotted: “the symptom is considered like an 
equivalent of the real… the Imaginary, the body, what separates the body from 
the ensemble constituted by the knot of the symptom to the Symbolic”19. 
I would like to higlight two very precise formulations from 1973, that is, a 
year before seminar RSI, given in the context of Lacan’s intervention in the La 
Grande Motte congress in November 2, 197320:
What I would like is that psychoanalysts were aware that everything has to bring 
them first to the solid support they find in the sign, and then that they should 
not forget that the symptom is a knot of signs. For the sign makes knots; … this 
shows that knots are absolutely capital, as I try to demonstrate in my seminar.21 
The first question is that there are types of symptoms, i.e. knots, that there is a 
clinic, a clinic that exists before the invention of analytic discourse, because 
Freud himself was its heir. Can analysis, can discourse, can the idea of the 
symptom as a knot, bring some light to this previous clinic? Yes, surely. Surely, 
but, alas, not certainly, here is the rub. It is not certain because certainty has 
15 Jacques Lacan, “Compte rendu de l’acte analytique” Ornicar ?, 29.
16 “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Le sinthome” in Ornicar ?, 6, p. 3; 18 November 1975.
17 “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Le sinthome” in Ornicar ?, 8, p. 15; 17 February 1976.
18 “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Le sinthome” in Ornicar 8, p. 19; 17 February 1976.
19 “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan: Le sinthome” in Ornicar 10, p. 12; 13 April 1976.
20 Jacques Lacan, Lettres de l’École Freudienne, n° 15, 1975, pp. 69–80.
21 Ibid., p. 78.
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to be transmitted and is demonstrated, and because history shows that this de-
mand of science, which needs to transmit and demonstrate in order to impose 
something as certain, is a demand that is made much earlier than when it can be 
substantiated. One will create a theory of épistémè, as they say today, that is an 
epistemology, much before science proper can be born.22  
Lacan illustrates here in an exemplary manner the clinical value of the symp-
tom as a knot. This is an idea that I find extremely helpful in my work with the 
most varied analysands, but in particular with transsexual analysands. With 
them, one can observe the emergence of a new materiality in meaning, a lan-
guage that seems to abandon the signifying chain. This chain will then be re-
placed by the Borromean knot in so far as it precipitates into writing. 
 
This is the idea that I wish to illustrate with my examples; it is also one of the 
lessons brought by RSI. Taking into account the complex relation that transgen-
der people have to their bodies—many often say that they are trapped in a body 
of the wrong (opposite) sex—I claim that an art similar to that of actual artists 
can be found in transsexual artificiality. In some cases, this art is tantamount 
to a symptom (sinthome) with a structural function analogous to the role Lacan 
ascribed to art, as he discovered it in the writing of Joyce. In Joyce’s case, his art 
was able to compensate for a defect in his subjective structure saving him from 
a destiny of madness. The sinthome-art grants access to a know-how which can 
repair faults in the psyche working as a supplement that holds together the reg-
isters of the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary in such a way that it fasten 
the subject in place. 
  
In the RSI session of January 21 1975, Lacan discusses something he heard from 
a patient in his practice concerning the repetition of a symptom and he says 
the following: “The important thing is the reference to writing. The repetition 
of the symptom is this something that I have just said is writing in an untamed 
way, what is involved in the symptom as it is presented in my practice.”23 Lacan 
sketches here the most fundamental features of what I call the clinic of the 
clinamen. We have chance encounter, the tychic occurrence that derives from 
22 Ibid., p. 79.
23 Jacques Lacan, “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan: R.S.I.”, session of January 21 1975.
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tuche, and almost at the same time its inscription in a writing process. I hope 
to illustrate this knotting of chance and necessity via writing in my examples.
Why do so many transsexuals write memoirs? This question has already been 
explored in an original manner by Jay Prosser24. He examined the narratives of 
those who crossed sexes and concluded that transsexual somatic transitions 
are spurred and enabled by narrative. My position is slightly different—I sug-
gest that transsexual memoirs allow us to see the function of art in ways that 
affect the life of everyone, men and women, transgender and cisgender25 alike. 
The transsexual’s request for a physical and sexual transformation brings us 
close to the etymological meaning of techné which in Greek means both “tech-
nique” and “technology” rather than “art” in the sense of “fine-arts” as Heideg-
ger has skillfully demonstrated. Other equivalents would be “expertise,” “tech-
nical knowledge” and even “science.” The art of the sinthome is art taken in this 
extended sense; it is a know-how, a sort of singular tacit knowledge that cannot 
transfer to another person but that holds the individual, preventing them from 
falling apart. In the case of sex-change memoirs one could argue that by way of 
writing the memoir gives the author a body that can be named. Writing elevates 
the unsymbolizable, the “invisible kernel, that meaningless fragment of the 
Real”26 to something that can be named.
Prosser observed that transsexuals already are involved a writing process dur-
ing their first visits to a clinician’s office where in order to be taken seriously 
a transsexual has to engage in a founding auto-biographical act, an act of re-
counting a plausible story of gender trouble triggered by an institutional re-
quest or demand. This mandatory account will facilitate a certain embodiment, 
and this autobiography “is also a kind of second skin: the story the transsexual 
must weave around the body in order that his body may be read”27.
24 Jay Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality, New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1998.
25 “Cis” is as a prefix in Latin which means “on the same side [as]” or “on this side [of].” 
“Cisgender” or “cis male” or “cis female” are used to refer to those who do not identify as 
transgender.
26 Slavoj Zizek, The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieślowski Between Theory and Post-Theo-
ry, London: British Film Institute, 2001, p. 12.
27 Posser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality, p. 101.
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Prosser chooses here a very loaded word, since most transsexual persons use 
the verb “read” to mean “guessing somebody’s anatomical identity.” Being 
“read” often entails “to pass” or “not to pass” for other than one is. Max Wolf 
Valerio, an American Indian/Latino poet, writer, and performer who transi-
tioned from feminist lesbian woman to heterosexual man, chronicled in detail 
the first 5 years of his hormonal and social transformation from female to male. 
To his chagrin, he discovered that taking testosterone left him with an incipient 
receding hairline. Besides some trepidation about his sudden interest in watch-
ing hair transplant TV infomercials, Valerio welcomed this change as a poten-
tial cue for people to read him as male28. Helen Boyd, who, as she put it, lost her 
husband to another woman when he became the other woman (her husband, 
a cross-dressing heterosexual man, decided to consider sex reassignment sur-
gery and become a woman.) Boyd wrote in She’s Not the Man I Married: My Life 
With a Transgender Husband: “It is almost impossible for Betty to present as a 
feminine male because her femininity means that she [husband] is often read 
as a woman”29. Valerio and Boyd use “read” differently, but they seem to agree 
that gender is a matter of interpretation, that gender is always a representa-
tion to be decoded. The reference to  “reading” refers to Lacan’s elaborations on 
“writing,” a function he ascribed to the symptom when he called it “sinthome.” 
Like Prosser, Hausman observed that the transsexual population is a well-read 
group for strategic reasons30. To successfully obtain the medical treatments re-
quested, the story of transsexuality has to match an officially sanctioned etiol-
ogy. Indeed, the account has to be convincing: The very telling of the “right” 
story can confer legitimacy to the request for a sex change and grant access to 
hormones treatments and surgical interventions. Therefore the autobiographi-
cal reports delivered to the clinical experts have to conform to the constraints 
of a genre. Hence, published or unpublished transsexual autobiographers will 
follow the formal constraints of the genre quite systematically. Of course this 
will impose limits to the construction of transsexual subjectivity. Sandy Stone 
writes that the installation of an “official transsexual history” needed to obtain 
28 Max Wolf Valerio, The Testosterone Files: My Hormonal and Social Transformation from 
Female to Male, Emeryville: Seal Press, 2006, p. 324.
29 Helen Boyd, She’s Not the Man I Married: My Life With a Transgender Husband, Emeryville: 
Seal Press, 2007, p. 85.
30 Bernice L. Hausman, Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender, 
Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1995, p. 143.
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access to surgical and hormonal sex change treatment has produced a situa-
tion in which the potential for the “intertextuality”31 of transsexual subjectiv-
ity is erased because the person requesting a sex change goes great lengths to 
appear as a “normal” transsexual. The “authentic experience is replaced by a 
particular kind of story, one that supports the old constructed positions.”32 A 
transsexual who suppresses the ambiguities and complexities of lived experi-
ence for the sake of normality is thus not very different from the patient who 
comes to see an analyst because the plausible story no longer efficiently lies 
about the past; in both cases, a symptom is endowed with the potential to start 
the analytic process. Yet, even when the transsexual narrative repeats the old 
clichés, one cannot downplay the tremendous impact that the encounter with 
a sex change memoir has had for many transsexuals. Almost all the sex change 
memoirs include a moment in which the author recounts reading another sex-
change memoir. Often revelatory, the discovery of this type of text proves to be 
a defining moment anchoring the subject in the realization of an identity and 
often has creative and transformative functions. Memoirs of sex change are not 
only numerous but also often have an impressive, life-transforming effect on the 
future transsexuals who happen to read them—the experience of reading other 
people’s memoirs becomes a turning point in their evolution. Those who read 
them before starting their process of metamorphosis tell us that encounter with 
the text is a completely transformative experience that reveals a truth up to then 
unknown, but that once acknowledged, starts a process that is unstoppable. 
In 2005, Jonathan Ames published a well-received anthology of transsexual 
memoirs. Ames aptly summed up the structure of sex change autobiographies 
as a three-act saga: “first act: gender-dysphoria childhood; second act: the move 
31 Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” in Julia Epstein and 
Kristina Straub (eds.), Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity, New York 
& London: Routledge, 1991. “Intertextuality” is a term introduced by Julia Kristeva in the 
late 1960’s. In this context it would refer to the multiple meanings of texts. For Kristeva, 
text is not a closed off entity but the result of an author’s borrowing and transformation 
of prior texts as well as of the reader’s attribution of meaning, which concerns not just the 
text in question but a network of texts invoked by the reader in the reading process. See 
Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1980.
32 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto”, p. 295.
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to the big city and the transformation ... [third act] the sex change”33. For Ames, 
there is one basic outline for all transsexual memoirs: “A boy or a girl very ear-
ly on in life feels terribly uncomfortable in his or her gender role, and there is 
a sense that some terrible mistake has occurred, that he or she was meant to 
be the other sex”34. Ames takes transsexual autobiographies as Bildungsroman 
or “coming-of-age-novel”35. Ames observes that transsexual memoirs follow a 
progression in which the main characters, now aware of the “error of nature,” 
see family and society as trying to reform them. Often, the protagonists also 
struggle internally, taking great pains in trying to repress their drive to become 
the opposite sex. Eventually, our heroes leave their hometown and venture into 
the outside world, and they often end up in a big city. It is in this new context 
that they begin to masquerade as the other sex, perhaps only privately and 
eventually more publicly. With time, the disguise and perfected ability to pass 
become more and more permanent and successful, particularly in the second 
part of the 20th century with the increased availability of hormone treatments 
and surgical technologies to manipulate the body. Ablations and implants as 
well as the climactic sex reassignment surgery will finally allow the memoir’s 
protagonist to reclaim a place of self-acceptance and peace. Ames emphasizes 
the literary and sociological significance of these memoirs; their appeal should 
be universal insofar as they deal with questions that haunt everyone, such as 
“Who am I?” and “What am I?”
Ames’ description of transsexual memoirs as Bildungsroman or a novel of for-
mation is slightly misleading since transsexual memoirs could be described 
more accurately as novels of the artist, in a subgenre known as the Künstlerro-
man. There may not be such a huge difference between the two genres but this 
nuance is important for psychoanalytically influenced ears. On the one hand, 
one would have a formation (Bildung) of the unconscious, which means that 
unconscious phenomena are made visible in transsexual symptoms, while on 
the other hand one would come closer to art, hence to Lacan’s analysis of Joyce 
when he presents his writing, his art as a sinthome. 
33 Jonathan Ames, (ed.) Sexual Metamorphosis: An Anthology of Transsexual Memoirs, New 
York: Vintage Books, 2005, (p. xii).
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. xxi.
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Following the path of pathological “formations” of the unconscious, Catherine 
Millot36 and Moustapha Safouan37 have claimed that the conviction with which 
many transsexuals assert that they were born in the body of the wrong sex, 
makes them conclude that all transsexuals share a psychotic structure. Millot 
was the first to introduce the idea that the transsexual symptom could have a 
function structurally analogous to that which Lacan ascribed to writing when 
he took Joyce as an example. I disagree with their position in terms of diagno-
sis. In my practice, I found evidence that not all transsexuals are psychotic. In 
the same manner that Joyce was not psychotic, even if he was almost caught in 
a psychotic structure, especially in regards to what concerned his daughter. I 
recommend prudence when diagnosing transsexuals. I argue for a depatholo-
gization of transgenderism and thus take distance from the current pathologi-
cal approach that psychoanalysis takes toward transgenderism. In my clinical 
practice I prefer to talk about transsexual symptoms and they may appear in 
several psychic structures, neurosis, perversion, psychosis. 
One first consequence of Lacan’s theory of the sinthome is that it depathologizes 
transgenderism. If transgenderism is not an illness, a sex change cannot be 
either a treatment or a cure. We should in the name of the sinthome stop the 
systematic pathologization of the whole spectrum of transgender issues. 
The second contribution that is brought about by the concept of sinthome con-
cerns identification and identity. We should go beyond the model of imaginary 
identification (Lacan’s Mirror Stage) to understand sex changes38. Most commen-
36 Catherine Millot, Horsexe: Essay on Transsexuality, trans. Kenneth Hylton, New York: Au-
tonomedia, 1989. 
37 Moustapha Safouan, Études sur l’Œdipe: introduction à une théorie du sujet, Paris: Seuil, 
1974.
38 The Mirror Stage refers to the dual relationship humans have with their own body im-
age as illustrated by their mirror reflection. The visual identity the mirror grants also 
supplies an imaginary sense of “wholeness” that is in contradiction with the bodily sen-
sations of fragmentation. Although primarily imaginary, the Mirror Stage has also a sig-
nificant symbolic dimension. The Symbolic is there when the infant recognizes herself in 
the mirror and supposes with great jubilation that her image is her own, and looks back 
to the adult holding the infant (who stands in for the big Other) looking for the approving 
gaze that will confirm this image unifying the fragmented Real. See also Lacan’s paper, 
“The Mirror Stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic 
experience”, in Écrits.
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tators tend to stop at this point. This is the case of an author as gifted as Prosser. 
The Mirror Stage, Lacan hypothesized, is a stage that infants pass through in 
which the external image of the body (reflected in a mirror or represented by the 
loving gaze of the main caregiver, often the mother) is internalized as a unified 
body. This image, which will become the “I,” is an idealized imago and will be 
the blueprint for emerging perceptions of selfhood. It anticipates a bodily per-
ception of unity that does not correspond with the infant’s real neurological im-
maturity and vulnerability. It also creates an ideal of perfection that the subject 
will always strive to achieve. Here we can see how the Ego is dependent on an 
external object with which the infant identifies, how it is produced in alienation, 
that is, as other, as an illusion of reciprocity and a promise of wholeness, when 
the real experience of the body is fragmented because at this early stage the 
infant cannot even control its bodily movements. In the Mirror Stage the subject 
becomes an I in anticipation and alienated from itself. The dual relation of the 
body to the Ego, which is on the basis of the body image hypothesized, was quite 
different in the case of Joyce and it did not involved identification with an image 
but with writing. His Ego was supported by his art.
When Lacan turned his attention to Joyce’s art, he also discovered a new rela-
tion to the body. He observed that Joyce had a peculiar body, one that could fall, 
slip away, like an open envelope letting go of its contents. Lacan focused on a 
passage of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, when Stephen remembers a 
moment of rage at his schoolmates that suddenly faded away: He had felt his 
anger falling from him “as easily as a fruit is divested of its soft ripe peel”39. For 
Lacan, such a transformation of anger was curious and revealing. It could be 
generalized as encompassing a Joycean body, a body that could fall from one’s 
self, like a wrapping that does not fully hold40. In Joyce’s case, it was writing 
that would “hold” the body. 
The image of the body as a vacant shell, as an enclosure oppressing the self, is 
a recurrent theme in sex change autobiographical narratives. Raymond Thomp-
son, a female-to-male transsexual, poignantly describes this experience of the 
body as an ill-adjusted container: 
39 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, New York: Penguin, 1992, p. 87. 
40 Jacques Lacan, Le séminaire; Livre XXIII: Le Sinthome 1975–1976, Paris: Seuil, 2005, p. 149.
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I needed to be out of my body, to be free. It felt as if my “inner body” was forcing 
itself to the ends of my limbs. I was growing ever larger inside of me, making me 
feel I was bursting at the seams and wanting out…out…out!
Because this was impossible, this process would abruptly reverse and I would 
start to shrink inside myself. My whole inner body shrank until I became very 
small inside. It was as I became so small I had to find some safe place to hide 
inside myself. My tiny inner body was in unfamiliar surroundings, in a place it 
didn’t belong and I felt utterly unsafe. I became like a little shadow inside my 
physical body, a shadow running around everywhere trying to find somewhere 
inside.41 
The sex change appears as the only possible escape from the confines of exces-
sive jouissance: “I was trapped inside a living chamber of horrors”42. Lewins 
expanded this notion: “In the case of transsexuals locked inside a prison of 
flesh and blood, there is a constant ache for emancipation”43. The body is ex-
perienced as a burdensome exterior layer often worn like an ill-fitting piece of 
clothing one is impatient to shed. This is how Leslie Feinber describes it: “I 
think how nice it would be to unzip my body from forehead to navel and go on 
vacation. But there is no escaping it, I would have to pack myself along”44. Jan 
Morris reiterates a similar wish when she writes: “All I wanted was liberation, 
or reconciliation—to live as myself, to clothe myself in a more proper body, and 
achieve Identity at last.”45 Morris refers to her former body as an oppressive 
outer layer in which the real being, the true self, was locked; the urge to break 
free from it is pressing: “If I were trapped in that cage again nothing would keep 
me from my goal.”46 
41 Raymond Thompson What Took You So Long? A Girl’s Journey to Manhood, New York: Pen-
guin, 1995, p. 200.
42 Claudine Griggs, S/HE: Changing Sex and Changing Clothes (Dress, Body, Culture), Oxford 
& New York: Berg, 1998, p. 88.
43 Frank Lewins, Transsexualism in Transsexuals, Melbourne: Macmillan, 1995, p. 14.
44 Diane Leslie Feinberg, Journal of a Transexual, New York: World View Publishers, 1980, 
p. 20. 
45 Jan Morris, Conundrum: From James to Jan – An Extraordinary Personal Narrative of Trans-
sexualism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974, p. 104.
46 Ibid., p. 169.
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Taking into account the complex relationship that transsexuals have to their 
body I claim that an art similar to that of actual artists, if not necessarily with 
the genius of Joyce, can be found in transsexual artificiality. A transsexual who 
has been able to complete a true transition would have become an “Ego scrip-
tor” as Ezra Pound said in his Cantos47.
Thus, the third advantage of the use of the notion of sinthome concerns the man-
ner in which a material bodily transformation is not enough to change the body 
image. As we have seen, the body is basically fragmented and only sustained 
in a precarious sense of unity by imaginary relations. For Lacan, “the body, at 
least in the analytic perspective, is the body in so far as it creates an orifice ..., 
that by which it is knotted to some Symbolic or Real.”48. For psychoanalysis the 
body is a speaking body linked with culture and a specific imaginary realm. 
The body is sexual and to inhabit we assume a sexual positioning; this is not an 
easy task because the body is marked by the conundrum of sexual difference 
which is neither sex nor gender. One of the truths the transgender phenome-
non illustrates is that body and gender coherence is a fiction that is assumed 
through identification. It is absurd to ascribe to anatomy the role of normaliz-
er in a type of sexuality by focusing on the genitals or on a single prescribed 
act. This normalizing role has been challenged by transsexual discourse and 
practices. Sexual identity issues all revolve around this particular body, a body 
one is not born into but one that one becomes. But this identification with an 
image, which is like all forms of recognition a misrecognition, is not sufficient, 
it needs some kind of writing to anchor each subject to their body. Many people 
who feel trapped in a body of the “wrong” gender do experience the drive to 
write, to produce a text that narrates their experience, offering a testimony to 
their stories of transformation. It is in the writing of the sex change memoir that 
a different sort of bodily transformation takes place, when the body is written. 
Writing a sex change memoir aims not just at passing from one side to the other; 
it has the function to tying together body and text. Writing grants a different 
form of embodiment in which the body finds its anchor in the sea of language. 
In the case of sex-change memoirs, I argue that writing of the memoir can bring 
the author home to the body transformed.
47 Ezra Pound, The Cantos of Ezra Pound, New Directions, 1996.
48 “Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan: R.S.I.”, session of May 13 1975 (unpublished).
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It is obvious that there are unavoidable tensions in transsexual autobiogra-
phies. If the aim of the autobiography is to document the transition, for in-
stance, to show how somebody born a man becomes a woman, the purpose of 
the transsexual’s memoir is in contradiction with the common transsexual’s 
claim that: “I was woman all along, but happened to be in the wrong body.” 
Prosser contends that this tension between transformation and continuity in 
the self is inherent to the autobiographical genre49. However, often the motiva-
tion for the transition is to accomplish a sex change that will not leave vestiges 
of the former sex on the body. If the transsexual wants a complete transforma-
tion to pass as a member of the new sex, the autobiography defeats this pur-
pose. By making public the account of the steps of the transition, very often 
documented with photographs, the autobiography somehow exposes the de-
coy. And yet, by publishing the account, the transsexual who does not want to 
be read as a transsexual but rather wants to pass as normal will become public-
ly recognized as a transsexual. Prosser emphasizes this paradox and highlights 
the fact that while there may be sex changes accomplished by surgery and hor-
mones, the somatic transformation is not sufficient. Writing autobiographies 
of sex change generates transitional moments that are “more in keeping with 
the flow of the story to cohere the transsexual subject.” In this case, indeed, 
the narrative “enacts its own transitions”50. It is therefore this last stage of the 
transition, that is the narrative transition itself that I want to emphasize. It is 
a transition that takes places in and through writing, at a moment when the 
autography seems to recapture the body, thus anchoring it through a textual 
embodiment. This writing has the function of nomination. Let us take again 
the example of Jan Morris’ autobiography Conundrum. Of her previous life as 
James, Jan explains: “I was a writer. Full as I was of more recondite certainties, 
I have always been sure of that too. I never for a moment doubted my voca-
tion”51. In writing about her writing, Morris describes her style as if it was al-
ready revealing an essential, traditional femininity, “the quick emotionalism, 
the hovering tear, the heart-on-sleeve, the touch of schmaltz”52. Or again: “I 
often detected in myself a taste for the flamboyant ... often a compensation for 
uncertainty”53. Feeling that s/he has been a writer since early childhood, Morris 
49 Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality, p. 119.
50 Ibid., p. 123.
51 Morris, Conundrum, p. 67.
52 Ibid., p. 133.
53 Ibid., p. 132.
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condenses this posture in a hedonist mode: “Creating to please my senses was 
certainly my own literary method.”54
More deeply though, writing had been an attempt to make body and spirit co-
here, less to please her senses than as an effort to find a strategy capable of 
regulating excess jouissance. This was achieved by way of an artifice, of a sup-
plement (in the same way, there was the sex change but also writing about it) 
that allowed for an incarnation of what before had only been experienced in 
the Real. This Real corresponds to what is enacted in mystical phenomena or 
realized in psychosis: It is founded on the impossibility of sexual equivalence 
or rapport, which was at root the “sexual incongruity” experienced by Morris.
Prosser talks about “transsexual mirror stages”55 and quotes Morris’s mirror 
scene in Conundrum, minutes before going to the operating room for a sex 
change in Morocco. Already anaestheized, pubic hair shaven and disinfected, 
Morris staggers while going “to say good bye to myself in the mirror. We would 
never meet again, and I wanted to give the other self a long last look in the eye, 
and a wink for luck.” The person who writes will emerge “alive and well, and 
sex-changed in Casablanca. ... I had a new body”56. This scene is not only a 
transitional moment in Morris’s transsexual trajectory but also the most crucial 
point in the transsexual narrative. As Prosser comments, this is when the “me” 
written about in the biography and the “I” that writes become one; they had 
been “so far separated by sex” and now are “fused into a singly sexed autobio-
graphical subject, an integral ‘I’”57. Here is the place where I see the function of 
Lacan’s Ego as scriptor.
It is indeed the writing of the memoir that allowed Morris to “embody” her 
body. It was not enough to undergo the sex reassignment surgery to reknot the 
Imaginary, the Real and the Symbolic. The key to why Morris woke up ecstatic 
from the surgery despite the sharp pain: “I found myself, in fact, astonishing-
ly happy”58 is to be found in the comment of the Moroccan surgeon who per-
formed her sex change. During the postoperative examination, Dr. B. comment-
ed in a mix of French and heavily accented broken English, nicely rendered in 
54 Ibid., p. 95.
55 Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality, p. 101.
56 Morris, Conundrum, pp. 140–141.
57 Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality, p. 100.
58 Morris, Conundrum, p. 140.
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Morris’s transcription: “Très, très bon, you could nevair get surgery like this in 
England—you see, now you would be able to write.”59 Now being “able to write,” 
Jan Morris wrote and constructed with Conundrum a text that gives credibility 
to her being a woman. Thus, the memoir comes full circle. It opens with “I was 
three years old when I realized that I have been born in the wrong body and 
should really be a girl. I remember the moment well, it is the earliest memory of 
my life.”60 Since “it is only in writing this book that I have delved so deeply into 
my emotions”61, it was also through writing that Morris completed the evolution 
toward a solution to the conundrum of her existence. The book closes with:
if I stand back and look at myself dispassionately, as I looked at myself that night 
in the mirror in Casablanca—If I consider my story in detachment I sometimes 
seem, a figure of a fable or allegory. ... I see myself not as a man or woman, self 
or other, fragment or whole, but only as a wondering child with the cat beneath 
the Bluthner [piano].62 
This is the vignette with which the autobiography begins and ends. It keeps ac-
quiring new meaning through writing. The letter may be the same, but it reads 
differently. Morris, now Jan, has acquired savoir faire, know-how. Finally a One 
of body and soul has been achieved through Morris’s singular sinthomatic iden-
tification, and it testifies to the power of transformation contained in writing.
Sex change memoirs are meant to be read, to be interpreted. They beg for deci-
phering. They are as often symptoms as sinthomes. Does this mean that they are 
great literature? Perhaps not, at least not always, but they all aspire to the most 
essential function of literature. They are love letters to others or to oneself that 
somehow inscribe sexual difference. Writing a sex change memoir aims not just 
at passing from one side to the other. 
In some cases, writing about one’s transsexual transformation is of the order 
of the sinthome; there are many cases when the transformation achieved a re-
knotting of the three registers of the real, symbolic, and imaginary. Then, the 
59 Ibid., p. 142; italics in the original.
60 Ibid., p. 3.
61 Ibid., p. 169.
62 Ibid., p. 174.
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sinthome shapes the singularity of an “art,” a techne that reknotted a workable 
consistency for the subject; this movement can best be evoked by saying that it 
moves the subject from a certain contingency to absolute necessity. Thus, Mor-
ris describes her trajectory as inevitable, predestined, as if the sex change had 
always been bound to happen: 
I do not for a moment regret the act of change. I could see no other way, and it has 
made me happy. ... Sex has its reasons too, but I suspect the only transsexuals 
who can achieve happiness are those ... to whom it is not primarily a sexual di-
lemma at all—who offer no rational purpose to their compulsions, even to them-
selves, but are simply driven blindly and helplessly. ... We are the most resolute. 
Nothing will stop us, no fear of ridicule or poverty, no threat of isolation, not 
even the prospect of death itself.63 
One can see why her sinthome was necessary: It was necessity itself. A sinthome 
is what does not cease to be written. In Morris’ case, the sinthome has produced 
less a “woman” than a “woman of letters.”
Sexual difference is neither just the body (as biological substrata) nor the psy-
chic introjections of the social performance of gender (a socially constructed 
role). Neither the perspective of biological essentialism nor that of social con-
structivism have been able to solve the problem of unconscious sexual differ-
ence. Since sexual difference is neither sex nor gender, sex needs to be symbol-
ized, and gender needs to be embodied.
I will reiterate my claim that sex change memoirs are a narrative form with 
a specific function for the subjectivity of their authors. In some cases, trans-
sexual memoirs can function as a process of self-invention for their authors. 
Moreover, sex change memoirs provide an excellent testing ground for Lacan’s 
theory of the sinthome as art. Even though we know that the psychoanalytic 
perspective on sexual difference implies that it is not a question of anatomy 
but rather of its consequences, we have noted that a majority of transsexuals 
struggle to conform rigidly to the normative demands of a sexual identity in 
contradiction with their anatomical sex. While they engage in technologically 
63 Ibid., pp. 168–169.
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assisted manipulations of their bodies, their torment seems to be the result of 
the limits imposed by an anatomy experienced as a tragic destiny. 
Let us take now the example of the book by Mario Martino, Emergence, which 
the jacket copy advertised as “the only complete autobiography of a woman 
who has become a man.” This book is presented as the account of a “painful life 
to live, a painful life to write”64. Martino, a nurse, played the dual role of subject 
of study and clinical authority using psychoanalytic jargon, which generates 
some humorous self-awareness. Evoking his contempt for the father’s repres-
sive violence and his adoration for the mother, Martino comments: “A bit of 
Oedipus, you think?”65. Martino describes a second phalloplasty that seemed 
to fail as the first one did and the neopenis had to be surgically excised. As the 
tip of his new penis became black, rotted away, and necrotized, he had to sit in 
water every night to slowly cut away dead tissue. He comments ironically: “Talk 
about castration complex! Psychologically this cutting was almost impossible 
for me, yet it has to be done.”66 Mario broke away from the increasing distress 
about the inadequate results of surgery when he came to the realization that 
even if he wanted “a perfect phallus” he had to accept the impossibility of 
the wish. “So today I’m happy with what I have: a respectable phallus—three 
fourths perfect.”67 
The idea of imperfection is also mentioned by Renée Richards. She was asked 
at age 72 about the motivations for her sex change more than 30 years before. 
By a striking coïncidence, Richards described her decision to change sex as 
resulting from an unyielding “pressure to change into a woman.” This cannot 
but evoke Lacan’s expression pousse-à-la-femme of push-towards-Woman used 
to refer to the feminization most often observed in psychosis but considered a 
generalized phenomenon common to several psychic structures.68
Richards also said that she wished she could have something that could have 
stopped that “pressure” and prevented the surgery: “What I said was if there 
64 Mario Martino, Emergence: A Transsexual Autobiography, New York: Crown Publishers, 
1977, p. xi.
65 Ibid., p. 28.
66 Ibid., p. 262.
67 Ibid., p. 263.
68 See Jacques Lacan, “L’étourdit” in Autres écrits, Paris: Seuil, 2001.
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were a drug, some voodoo, any kind of mind-altering magic remedy to keep the 
man intact, that would have been preferable, but there wasn’t”69. By then, she 
seemed to have regrets about something that she had felt earlier as inevitable: 
“Better to be an intact man functioning with 100 percent capacity for everything 
than to be a transsexual woman who is an imperfect woman.”70 
The notion of an “imperfect” solution relates to the etymology of the word 
“symptom.” As we have seen, up to the late 14th century the spelling of word 
was sinthoma. This is very close to its Greek predecesor symptoma, which 
means “a happening, accident, disease”. Its stem is sympiptein (to befall) which 
is combination of syn (together) and piptein (to fall.) In Greek, “symptom” lit-
erally means “falling together”. The word “fall” is cognate to the word “fail”. 
“Fail” comes from the old French falir, now faillir, “to be lacking, to miss, not 
succeed,” from the Latin fallere, “to trip, cause to fall”. Figuratively, “to deceive, 
trick, dupe, cheat, elude; fail, be lacking or defective”. The noun (as in “without 
fail”) is from late 13th century, from the old French faile, “deficiency,” derived 
from falir. The Anglo-French form of the verb failer, came to be used as a noun, 
hence “failure”.
This detour by way of etymology sketches a movement from failure to symp-
tom. To quote Samuel Beckett, I would say that the sinthome is the art of fail-
ing better; it consists of letting the symptom fall (falling together) which is pre-
cisely the art proposed by the Lacanian notion of sinthome—failing together 
with one’s unconscious, thus, as Beckett would say, “failing better”. It was that 
or death, as it was poignantly affirmed by several analysands. They all had a 
possibility of letting their bodies fall, like Stephen Dedalus, who, for Lacan, 
indicated Joyce’s main symptom. If Stephen is, in Joyce’s various schemes and 
tables of correspondences for Ulysses, a man without a body, it is because his 
body could not “hold him together” without the artifice of writing. As one of my 
analysands said, “I can right/write myself through writing”. For these analy-
sands, the sinthome will be mandatory as it were, a necessity that nevertheless 
also carries along a little defect. 
69 New York Times, February 1, 2007.
70 Ibid. 
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I want to conclude by equating art in general and the sinthome as the “art of 
failing better”. The idea of failure has been explored with precision in literary 
criticism71; Walter Benjamin’s observations are worth mention: “To do justice 
to the figure of Kafka in its purity and its peculiar beauty one must never lose 
sight of one thing: it is the purity and beauty of a failure. The circumstances 
are manifold. One is tempted to say: one he was certain of eventual failure, 
everything worked out for him en route as in a dream.”72 Benjamin’s comment 
evokes Beckett’s description of modern aesthetics in terms of “fidelity to fail-
ure”: “to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail.” Benjamin’s “beauty of 
failure” is a striking figure that marks a disjunction comparable to the disjunc-
tion presented by Lacan between truth and knowledge, the privation of truth, 
our love for knowledge facing the unrelenting acknowledgement that we are 
trapped in our passion for ignorance. I would like to suggest that the sinthome 
should be taken as a new way of organizing jouissance, but via failure, that is, it 
would be a way of failing better that would “allow one to live”. The art of failing, 
but better, better again. 
 
71 For a detailed analysis of art as failure see Ewa Ziarek’s excellent book The Rhetoric of Fail-
ure: Deconstruction of Skepticism, Reinvention of Modernism, New York: SUNY Press, 1995.
72 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death” in Illuminations: 
Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, pp 111–140, here p. 117 and “Some Reflections 
on Kafka” op. cit., p. 146.
